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INTENT, PURPOSE AND MOTIVATION IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
Leon Friedman'
Honorable George C. Pratt:.
Professor Leon Friedman teaches at Hofstra Law School and is an
active litigating attorney and lecturer who has lectured in this
program since the first year. We were just reminiscing at
lunchtime and after lunch our speaker was not there. I became a
little upset and wondered what to do. We got a telephone call that
the plane had been sent to some other airport and our scheduled
speaker was not going to be here. Leon offered to cover the lecture
and, without any notes, delivered a beautiful presentation on
something that he had about three minutes to prepare. This
morning he has a chance to outdo himself with a subject that, for
me, has my head spinning. He deals with the questions of motive,
purpose and intent in constitutional litigation, particularly as it
interacts with qualified immunity. After this morning's lecture, I
am sure I will understand it and have no further problems.
ProfessorLeon Friedman:
I will discuss the wonderful interrelation between intent, purpose
and motivation. I have always loved analyzing the difference
between these three concepts in the criminal procedure area. These
words are used interchangeably in three different areas of the law
and the words mean something different depending upon what area
you are talking about.

' LL.B. 1960 Harvard, Admitted New York Bar, 1961. Graduate Student,
History, Harvard GSAS; 1954-55; Assoc. Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler, NY 1960-67; Gen. Counsel, Chelsea House Publishers, 1968-70;
Associate Director NYC Bar Association Special Committee on Courtroom
Conduct, 1970-73; Staff Counsel ACLU 1973-74; Associate Professor Hofstra

1974-80; Professor since 1980.
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Let me briefly get the criminal part of it out of the way. We use
intent in the criminal law because at that point the key consideration
is whether one volitionally wanted to do that which one was
accused of doing. Intent in the criminal area is used to compare it
to some other concept which might bear on one's criminal liability.
A lawyer will examine whether conduct was intended, whether it
was negligent, or wether there was an accident. Intent is relevant
in criminal law because an act may or may not be a crime
depending upon the mental state with which it was done.
A defendant's purpose, assuming that the activity was volitional,
may effect sentencing. If a person stole some money in order to
help a starving grandmother, the purpose may be important
regarding sentencing guidelines. However, in the criminal law area,
it has a very limited purpose in defining the scope of the crime and
perhaps dealing with sentencing when it was all over.
Intent, purpose and motivation in constitutional litigation is
important in three other areas, one of which involves legislative
action. There is administrative action taken with a certain mental
state and then there is individual action by a state actor. Those are
the areas that I will discuss.
First, I will discuss legislative intent. I attended the Harvard Club
on Tuesday and Justice Scalia gave his usual speech on legislative
intent, which I have heard several times. It is getting better each
time because he adds a little bit to it. Yet, he gave another speech
on why legislative intent is irrelevant and why you must only look
at what the words say and not the legislative intent of the law. He
warns that it will get us into the individual motivation of legislators,
which is the worst thing that any judge could ever do, except when
a judge is required to do so. However, Justice Scalia indicates that
a judge may be allowed to examine legislative intent under some
circumstances.
Now, the starting point of all of this is the bedrock case of United
States v. O'Brien.2 "It is a familiar principle of constitutional law
that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive." 3 I was
2391
3Id.

U.S. 367 (1968).
at 383.
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one of the lawyers in the case of U.S. v O'Brien. As you may
remember, this is the draft card burning case. Congress, as a result
of some highly publicized protests by draft resistors burning their
draft cards, added a new section to the selective service law by
adding a five-year penalty to anyone who knowingly destroyed a
valid draft card.4 There is absolutely no doubt why they did it. I

think Representative Rivers of South Carolina saw draft protestors
burning their draft cards in protest of American policy. I forget
which island we were invading at the time, but the first draft card
burnings did not relate to Vietnam, but to the Dominican Republic.
I believe that we invaded the Dominican Republic back in the
1960's, and there were widespread protests and draft cards were
burned. The congressional record reflected that there was no doubt
as to why people protested. Congress did not like these flagrant
protests against our military policy and Congress passed a law to
proscribe such activity.5
It was already a crime, by the way, not to have a draft card in
your possession. If you burned your own draft card, you would no
longer have it in your possession, thus you would already be
subject to the crime of not having it in your possession. The First
Circuit said the law was unconstitutional because it did not serve
any purpose.6 The First Circuit said that if there is a big hole in the
fence for the big cat - namely a five year penalty for not having the
draft card in your possession - you do not need a small hole in the
fence for the little cat because the larger crime is already covered.'
If you bum your card, you no longer have it in your possession,
you already committed the other crime. The Court of Appeals said
the purpose of adding this law was a First Amendment purpose
namely to put down these protests.'

4

Id. at 370.

' See Dean Alfange, Free Speed and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card
Burning Case, 1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 3-6 (1968).
6 O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967), vacated, 391 U.S.
367 (1968).
7 d. at 540-41.

8Id.
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The Supreme Court held that a court can not look at legislative
motive. Six years before, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot;' which is the
Tuskegee gerrymandering case, the City of Tuskegee had an illegal
illicit motivation for carving out a section of Tuskegee so that a
majority of blacks could not elect a candidate of their choosing. 0 It
was an illicit legislative motive, namely, the motive to deprive the
black citizens of that locale of a place in the city council". The
court considered the illicit legislative motive in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot.12
Justice Douglas was the only dissenting Justice in O'Brien. 3 He
dissented on the ground that the draft was unconstitutional and
never addressed the First Amendment issue at all.14 Chief Justice
Warren, in his opinion in O'Brien, wrote that the worst thing one
could do is look at the individual motivation of legislators.' 5 The
majority argued that if someone makes a stray remark on the floor,
then it can be argued that such remarks are the purpose behind a
particular law, or that you may have to call them as a witness and
ask them for their individual motivation, which is even worse. 16 In
the parade of horribles, summoning legislators for testimony
appears to be worse than discussing the individual motivation of
legislators. And you can never do that, except in Arlington
Heights,17 where the Supreme Court said there is no absolute rule
against it and indeed you may be able to do it. Therefore, we have
this parade of horribles and then we have all kinds of exceptions to
the parade of horribles. However, the Supreme Court in the
O'Brien case said that there is a very limited and well-defined class
of cases where the very nature of the constitutional question

9364 U.S. 339 (1960).
'0Id. at 340.
" Id. at 341.
12 Id. at 342.
13O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 389.
14 id.
" Id. at 383-84.
16Id. at 384.
17 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. at 268 (1977).
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requires an inquiry into legislative purpose."8 Therefore, one may
not inquire into legislative purpose, unless required by law.
Now when must you do it? Well, there are at least three areas
where you must inquire into legislative purpose. First, I will discuss
the process as it relates to legislation and I will delve into
administrative and individual decision making later. An inquiry
into legislative purpose is required to prove a constitutional
violation to strike down a law. A plaintiff's burden of proof is to
show that the legislation had an illicit purpose. The common areas
where legislative intent is relevant are in bill of attainders,
establishment of religion, equal protection, and at times First
Amendment areas. Matters involving a bill of attainder law is
where a legislative action is directed against an individual or a
group of individuals with the intent to inflict punishment.
For example, in Nixon v. Administration of General Services,' 9
Congress passed a law taking away the tapes and papers of Richard
Nixon. He was the only president of the United States whose tapes
and papers were taken away. The government would not allow him
to have them in his possession and he argued that the law taking
away the tapes and papers was a bill of attainder. Nixon argued
that he was being punished, and the Supreme Court agreed. The
Court contended that only Nixon was being hurt, but there was no
intent.2° The legislature did not intend to hurt the President as he
was in a class of one. Namely, he was the only president who left
office one step ahead of the sheriff, and therefore, the government
had a legitimate reason to look into papers and them was no intent
to punish him and one must look at that.
One must look at purpose and intent. Sometimes legislatures pass
laws that hurt, injure, take something away, or punish you, but if
an argument is framed using a bill of attainder analysis, one must
show that the legislative purpose was indeed to injure or hurt. How
do you show injury? You do not show injury by looking for
language from the legislature such as "I hate this person or I want

"'391 U.S. at 384 n.30.
19433 U.S. 425
20Id. at

468.

(1977).
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21
to hurt you." This is unacceptable. In United States v. Lovett,
the United States Government indicated that a person shall never
work for the United States again and passed a law to that effect.22
By reviewing legislative history, it was very obvious that there was
an intent to injure.'
On a similar note, I am now working on a bar association report
on whether Congress can pass a law censuring Bill Clinton and
imposing a fine on him for the wrongs he committed. The critical
issue is whether censuring him and imposing a fine on him is a bill
of attainder. The question is whether Congress is trying to hurt
Clinton by passing such a law. I do not think so. A bill of
attainder is a very funny little article of the Constitution that keeps
coming up, it is not a dead letter by any means.
A second area is the Establishment Clause,' where you must look
at the legislative purpose under Lemon v. Kurtzman.' If there is a
law which is alleged to establish religion, you have the following26
test. "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose."
If the statute does not have a secular purpose and advances religion,
then it may very well violate the establishment clause. Let's look at
the two big
cases recently, Wallace v. Jaffree27 and Edwards v.
28
Aguillard.
In Wallace v. Jaffiree, an opinion written by Justice Stevens,
involved the minute of silence in the Alabama schools.29 In
Wallace, the Supreme Court indicates that there is no need to look
at the second or third criteria if the statute does not have a clearly
secular purpose." Although a statute is motivated in part by a
religious purpose, in applying the purpose test, it is necessary to

21328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
'2 Id. at 305.

B2Id. at 315.
24U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Id.
2'403 U.S. 602 (1971).
26 Id. at 612.
2'472 U.S. 38 (1985).
2'482 U.S. 578 (1987).
2'472 U.S. at 40.
30Id. at 56.
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ask whether the government's actual purpose is to endorse or
disapprove of religion." Every other sentence in the opinion is
talking about purpose. The sponsor argued that introducing the
moment of silence was to bring prayer back into the school. 32 He
was called as a witness and testified about his statements. I think
there were three dissents in that case. Justice Scalia was not on the
Court at that time. This case was the year before Justice Scalia got
there.
Two years after Justice Scalia gets on the Court, we have
Edwards v. Aguillard. In Eavards, the State of Louisiana passed a
law saying that if you teach evolution, you must teach
creationism.33 Neither area is required to be taught in the
curriculum, but if evolution is taught, creationism must be taught
as well.'
Now, what is wrong with that? It is facially invalid as a violation
of the establishment clause because the purpose was to advance
religion. Justice Scalia's dissent immediately says what the
problem is here. 3 Justice Scalia gets into purpose and he says
what is wrong with the case is that one must look at individual
motivation. The majority does not dispute the fact that you have to
look at the individual motivation of the legislator. One must not
look at the individual motivation of legislators unless one is
required to look at the individual motivation of legislators. Thus,
his whole dissent is that in order to apply the Lemon36 test, which of
course he does not like, you have got to look at whether the
purpose is a secular purpose or to advance religion.37 In order to
look at wether a secular purpose or a religious purpose is being
advanced, you have to look at individual motivation of legislatures,
which is not allowed except that it is done. However, in the
establishment area, no one pays a lot of attention to it. In short, we
31 Id.

32id.
33

at 39.
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 581.

3 Id.

Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
(Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at
612-13.
3 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35

361d.
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have to look at purpose that may require an inquiry into motivation.
Justice Stevens has stated that we have to decide whether the
legislature was motivated by a secular purpose. There is nothing so
horrible about that except how you do it. It is still the law by the
way. You still have to decide, under the Lemon test, whether there
is a secular purpose and it is part of the way of proving your point
of view.
Equal protection law prohibits any purpose which may
disadvantage a racial or secular group protected under the Equal
Protection Clause."
Equal protection had been invoked from
3
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 9 where there was an improper motivation
in drawing the legislative lines that would disfavor minorities up to
Shaw v. Reno,4" and all the most recent cases where a legislative
purpose to advantage a minority group undercuts the law. We have
had a whole series of five to four decisions from the Supreme
Court. There have been six cases since Shaw v. Reno.4" I think
the last one was Abrams v. Johnson42 which was Miller v.
Johnson. 3 A Louisiana case, Reno v. Bossier Parish School
Board also involved an equal protection claim involving legislative
purpose. In all of the cases mentioned, the issue is the purpose or
motivation of the legislature where the predominant motive is
racial. Now, in Gomillion,45 there was a racial motive to
disadvantage the black citizens in depriving them of a right to have
a representative in the Tuskegee city council. More recently, in
Louisiana, the motive was to provide an advantage to a particular
group, that is to say to draw race conscious lines so that the
legislature would reflect on some proportional representation basis,
the actual population in the various states.46
See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), see also
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
38

3 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
40509
U.S. 630 (1993).
41
id.
42521 U.S. 74 (1997).
43515 U.S. 900 (1995).
44520 U.S. 471 (1997).

45Gomillion, 364 U.S. 339 (1961).
46 See Reno, 520 U.S. 471.
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By the way, I have to confess, I was involved in a South Carolina
case47 involving the South Carolina legislature, and I was on the
wrong side, if I may put it that way. I was representing the white
Democratic party and our opposition was the State of South
Carolina, the Attorney General of the United States, the ACLU and
the Republican National Committee who liked the lines. All my
ACLU friends were on the other side, spitting on me. Yet, we won
the case because the lines were clearly drawn with race in mind.
The lines were redrawn and another election was planned. Every
black representative was re-elected and there were seven more
democrats elected to the state legislature. South Carolina did very
well this year under these redrawn lines, but the key point in all of
that was that race was the predominant motive in drawing the lines.
It is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause to draw lines based
on race, and it does not make any difference whether you draw the
line with race in mind to help or draw the line with race in mind to
hurt. The motive is the salient factor in determining whether the
law shall prevail.
It is important to note that this is not only a racial issue. In
PersonalAdninistrator of Massaclusetts v. Feeney,48 veterans had
a preference in obtaining employment in Massachusetts. If you
were a veteran, you did not just get five extra points or ten extra
points, you were put at the top of the list. If there was someone
who barely passed the entrance exam and earned a "C" and the
person was competing with a non-veteran who was a Nobel Peace
Prize winner, and got a perfect score, the veteran would get the job
over the person at the top of the list. The differential treatment
between the sexes indicate that women suffer because women were
not veterans. The Supreme Court stated that in order to prove an
equal protection violation, one must prove that the legislature acted
to accomplish an end in response to a situation rather than "in spite
of" the adverse effect.4 9 In order to prove an equal protection

violation, one must show that the legislators desired a particular
result. In the equal protection area, there is absolutely no doubt that
' Smith v. Beasley, 946 F. Supp. 1174 (D.S.C. 1996).
4'442
U.S. 256 (1979).
49
Id. at 279.
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the plaintiff's burden, in order to succeed in invalidating the
legislation, is to demonstrate the invalid legislative purpose.
There is a wonderful case in the D.C. circuit involving Rupert
0 in which the
Murdock, News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC,"
legislature passed a law which prohibited someone from owning
both a newspaper and television station in the same area. On the
face of it, there is nothing wrong with that. There are too many
people and too few media outlets. There was only one person that
was really affected and Rupert Murdock claimed injury. Senator
Holings passed an amendment that was very specific that did not
say anything about Rupert Murdock. His name was not in the
legislation and the premise for passing the law was hidden.
However, it was very clear what the legislators had in mind, and
the D.C. Circuit struck it down. There was a bill of attainder
argument made, but it was hard to succeed on that. The court
struck down the law on First Amendment grounds. They said
when legislation affecting speech appears underinclusive, where it
singles out conduct for adverse treatment and leaves untouched
conduct which seems indistinguishable in terms of the law's
ostensible purpose, the omission is bound to raise a suspicion that
the law's target is the message."'
Accepting that intuition without making an actual determination of
the legislature's motives, the Supreme Court has, for the regulation
of speech, insisted on a closer fit between its apparent purpose than
for any other kind of legislation. The Supreme Court often asks
whether a law is content-based. To determine whether a law is
content-based, the Court looks at the general effect on the market or
considers First Amendment issues. There is no way to determine
the validity of some laws without questioning its purpose. The
FCC case is one area regarding First Amendment law where there
is an inquiry of the legislative purpose of a law.
There are cases dealing with zoning laws such as Playtime
Theaters, Inc. v. City of Renton 2 and Boos v. Barty3" where the
50 News America Publishing, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 844
F.2d
800 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
5
'1d. at 805.
S2 4 7 5 U.S. 41 (1986).
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zoning law is passed to prohibit the operation of adult entertainment
establishments. One way to determine if the law is valid is if the
purpose of the law is to affect the secondary effects of the activity."
If the purpose is to prohibit content then a particular law is invalid.
In cases involving zoning law, there is a prohibition of seeking
legislative motivation. The Supreme Court has established a legal
test requiring you to look at purpose, and it is difficult to look at
purpose other than by reviewing what the legislatures say.
I agree, it is very hard to drag out of a legislature the purpose in
passing a law. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development,55 the Court indicated that there might be
legislative immunity. Arlington Heights was an administrative
decision. It is easier when you deal with an administrative
decision, than it is with a true legislative decision. In Bogan v.
5 6 which was decided last year, legislators were sued
Scott Haris
for employing improper purposes in enacting legislation. At this
juncture, we can not sue anymore. The Court stated that if it looks
like a law, smells like a law, quacks like a law, it is a law and
individual people voting for it will have legislative immunity.
I will discuss when one must look at an individual legislator's
motivation. As I just mentioned, there are at least four areas where
the legislature's motivation is important. Legislative motivation is
critical in deciding cases involving Bill of Attainder, Establishment
Clause, Equal Protection and at least some First Amendment cases.
I worked on S. C.E.A. v. Canpbelr7 where the South Carolina
legislature passed a law prohibiting the South Carolina's
Educational Association from having dues check off privileges.
The South Carolina legislature was very unhappy with certain
liberal stands that the South Carolina Educational Association had
taken and they passed a general law saying no public employee
union has dues check off privileges. There was another union that
was also affected and they came back a year later saying they lost
53 485 U.S. 312 (1988).

"'Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 47.
55 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
56 523 U.S. 44 (1998).
-7 697

F. Supp. 908 (D.S.C. 1988).
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half their membership dues without check off privileges so the
legislature gave it back to them and the only public service
organization that did not have it was the South Carolina Educational
Association. We went in to court on a bill of attainder theory and
challenged the activitypon First Amendment grounds. We won on
the trial level, but the circuit court reversed."8 The circuit court
indicated that we were requesting the court to look at motivation,
by which the court is precluded.
Sometimes you can inquire into motivation in the First
Amendment area and sometimes you can not. There is no blanket
rule as there is in the establishment and equal protection cases that
every time there is an alleged improper First Amendment purpose
behind legislation, you will be able to get into it and prove it. The
News America case is an example when you could, but sometimes it
is not so easy. 9
At this point, I will discuss how improper motivation is analyzed
if conducted by an administrative board or an individual. Assume
that we have a body which is acting administratively rather than
legislatively. In Bogan v. Scott-Harris,60 the defendant eliminated
the plaintiff's position as opposed to firing the individual. If the
defendant simply said, "I am going to fire you, you no longer have
this job," that would have been an administrative decision, and then
you are right into First Amendment retaliation, which involves
traditional analysis. The court must determine if a party exercised
First Amendment rights, if there is a causal connection between the
exercise of First Amendment rights and the adverse employment
decision. 6 The court must determine whether the exercise of First
Amendment rights was a substantial motivating factor in the
adverse employment decision. One certainly should be able to
question the defendant about the motivating factor.
Arlington Heights was changing the zoning laws to allow multidwelling housing so that some lower income housing could be built
m 697 F. Supp. 908 (D.S.C. 1988), rev'd, 883 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990).
59
News America Publishing, Inc., 844 F.2d 800.
6D 523 U.S. 44 (1998).
61 Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 280-81
(1977).
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in the town. The Supreme Court stated that in some extraordinary
instances legislators may be called to the stand to testify concerning
the purpose of the official action. Such testimony will frequently be
barred by privilege. At any rate, you are allowed to inquire as to
motivation in a non-legislative area where you have an
administrative board. I do not see any reason if it is the chief of
police or the administrative board making the decision that you
have to prove that they did it because it was a substantial motivating
factor.
The motive, purpose, intent, mental state of the
administrative board or of the individual is relevant and you must
be allowed to inquire into it, otherwise you can not prove one
element of First Amendment retaliation.
Now, Crmvford'2 tells us that there is no pleading requirement in
which you must plead specific facts to show that improper purpose
of motivation under Eighth Amendment analysis. The Eighth
Amendment is invoked to prove cruel and unusual punishment. A
plaintiff must show that the defendant's purpose to inflict pain is the
basis for the complaint. One must demonstrate purpose in some
constitutional litigation, or the elements of the case will not be
proven.
I must say the worst thing to do is bring members of a legislature
into court and question them about their motivation unless such
action is required. We have determined that when a defendant
board is acting administratively or dealing with a particular
individual, one must show that the party acted with a mental state
that the constitution prohibits under Equal Protection, First
Amendment retaliation, or the Eighth Amendment.
In the First Amendment area, we have a couple of shortcuts. One
of the shortcuts deals with activity that was performed in close
proximity in time to the exercise of a First Amendment right.64
You do not have to prove that a party acted in bad faith because of
hate and that the plaintiff said something which offended the
62 Crawford-El

v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment states in pertinent
part: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.

"San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 435, n.14 (3rd Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1082 (1995).
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defendant. If there is a close proximity in time between the
exercise of First Amendment right and the adverse action, then you
have met your burden on the second part of the four part test."6 To
prove First Amendment retaliation, the plaintiff must show the
exercise of a First Amendment right - that is, the employee spoke
on a matter of public concern, then adverse action was taken -- and

that there was a causal connection between the exercise of First
Amendment rights and the adverse action. Then the burden shifts
to the defendant to show that the plaintiff would have been fired
anyway. The burden shifting must be shown by a preponderance of
the evidence. The final element that creates intense bickering is
where a defendant takes adverse action because of the plaintiff's
exercise of a First Amendment right, but, nevertheless, there is a
legitimate governmental reason for taking such action. In the First
Amendment retaliation area, you can avoid the individual inquiry of
members of the administrative board or of the individual by
showing this causal connection. Obviously, if you have somebody
who says, "Did you see what this teacher said in yesterday's
newspaper? Boy, I am going to get that teacher," then you do not
need the causal connection; you have something right out of their
mouth to show the illicit purpose.
In Arlington Heights,6 6 the Supreme Court demonstrated that in
equal protection analysis there is no violation unless discriminatory
intent is shown. You have to look at the mental state so that intent
is required. Again, no one is fighting over the difference between
the purpose or motivation in the equal protection area because it is
an element of the constitutional violation. In Arlington Heights,67
the town won in the Supreme Court, and then they lost in the
Seventh Circuit on remand because the plaintiffs were able to show
intent; they were able to show an improper discriminatory motive
so they were able to succeed, even in that case.

' Stever v. Independent School Dist. No. 625, 943 F.2d 845 (8th Cir.
1991).
"Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. at 268 (1977).
6 id.
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Honorable George C. Pratt.
I could have cleared up this whole area when I was a district judge
relatively new on the bench. I had a case involving Island Tree
school district, where the school board members ordered certain
books to be taken off the library shelves.6' The civil liberty union
felt this was a First Amendment violation, as the books were
obviously selected for their content, at least, by some of the school
board members. I dismissed the case. The former school attorney
knew how school boards operated and so forth, it was obvious to
me somebody has to decide what must go on the library shelves and
the only way to do that is by content. So there is no difference
between putting them on and taking them off, I dismissed it. The
Second Circuit wrote three opinions, they reversed me two to one,
it went to the Supreme Court, they upheld the Second Circuit five
to four, and they wrote seven opinions.69 The end result was to
remand it to me to decide what was the intent of the school board
when they passed the regulation. I thought, "here is my chance," I
am going to insist that they bring in every school board member
and examine them as to what was going through his or her mind.
As a result, I had a high public interest case. My intent, at this
point, was to show how asinine the Supreme Court was in trying
ever to determine what a board's intent was. They settled that case.
Had the case gone ahead, we might not have had an awful lot of
this subsequent litigation, but so be it.

' Pico v. Board Of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School District, 474 F.
Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), revd, 457
U.S. 853 (1982).
6 Id.
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